

\cii\postoped  
October 31, 1987

NTY Oped came out today: "The Day Castro Almost Started World War III".

Notes on elements left out of piece, in cutting it; and further aspects to be discussed.

1. "Why couldn't Khrushchev just tell Kennedy that the Cubans had fired the AA, and that the SAM firing was insubordinate?"

2. "Who fired the SAM?" Evidence.

3. Whole set of Burlatsky quotes: including, camouflage; assurance by High Command that secrecy could be preserved, that K could get away with it. (B didn't believe; K wanted to believe.)  
"I'm certain that Castro caused it."

4. Firefight: possibilities. (and see 2 and 3). Including Mongoose.

5. Relations of superpowers to small allies: On the one hand, the US (and SU) takes great risks to avoid losing or damaging the relationship, or its "credibility." (See K fears of "losing Cuba"--K memoirs, Burlatsky--). At the same time, to avoid this, it risks the destruction of the small power itself! (Cuba, Turkey; VN--both sides!) The latter is part of a general lack of concern about the small power's interests, in a crunch: both US and SU prepared to sacrifice latter, without even consulting: though US showed more concern about informing, bringing Turks aboard (fear of reaction of other allies if Turkey was dumped; and see French reaction anyway).

CHECK: article on Turkish politics at the time; MacMillan's memoirs, on his reaction.

See my involvement in Turkish question: options; cable to Turks, Hare, Finletter; to Nitze...that night, to mirror; crying, with hsr.

6. Estimates of the probability of war: how were they reflected, how were they acted on, or not acted on. Nitze to hsr; hawks to Blight; JFK. What was their basis; what was a realistic basis.

7. What would have happened if K had not folded? If Castro had shot down recon anyway? If JFK had folded on Saturday?

8. Different article: Why did SU get in?

9. Why did Cuba allow missiles? See evolution of crisis out of Mongoose and invasion fears: i.e., a covert operation (for both SU and Cuba).

10. General tendency on US side to ignore independence of SU

2

satellites. (Greece; Indochina; NLF; Nicaragua/Cuba/SU; Cubans in Angola...

C:/c ii/postoped

\cmc\Hampson  
June 17, 1991

✓ Notes on Fen Osler Hampson, "The Divided Decision-Maker," International Security Winter 1984-85, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 130-165

(See note in \cmc\themes, June 17, 1991)

I think of JFK as "creating" a national security crisis (rather than K); but this is as seen by many of the insiders on the ExComm, led by McNamara (and probably the President). Or rather: they may never have seen it consciously that way, but that reflected denial; their own evaluation of the situation clearly implied that. As McN said, "This is not a military problem, it's a domestic political problem," based as much on what JFK had said as on anything K had done.

dem.   
 pol.   
 But that was not the case for the Republican challengers in the election campaign, who were already defining the Soviet non-nuclear buildup on Cuba as a national security problem, calling for a military response: a blockade if not an invasion. They could certainly be counted on to claim that missiles constituted a major national security problem, both for political reasons and because they simply did not agree with McNamara, JFK or McG. (They saw matters more like the JCS, Nitze or Dillon). From their perspective, K had unequivocally created the national security crisis.

us.   
 CMC   
 At the same time, they were unaware of JFK's Mongoose program--as both a provocation and evidence of JFK's concern and activism--or invasion preparations. (These bear on who initiated what the Soviets call the "Caribbean Crisis.") (Compare the public's ignorance--and perhaps JFK's, in detail--of the preparations of the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration for Cuba I, during the election campaign of 1960).

Suppose--what no one has ever hypothesized--that Khrushchev had moved MRBMs to Cuba in October, 1960--as he could have done! and as he talked about doing only a few months later, in the spring of 1961!--after Nixon had taken a soft line in the debates and had argued against the legality of US intervention in Cuba! The parallel to the Missile Crisis would have been exact, given the relative positions of the Administration and the challenger!

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"but, if missiles..." N would shift.

What I believe K expected JFK to do in October 1962--keep the Soviet missiles secret, if he discovered them, till after the Congressional elections--was exactly what Nixon intended to do about the Soviet sub base at Cienfuegos in August, 1970! He was thwarted in this by an "inadvertent" leak by a Pentagon press officer (really "inadvertent"?! This is exactly what JFK would have expected in 1962! Check accounts: was this not an attempt to

force Nixon's hand, based on suspicion either of him or perhaps of Kissinger?). Even then, Nixon used "quiet diplomacy": exactly what K would have expected from JFK. So my (and now Beschloss's) hypothesis about K's possible expectations in 1962 amounts to imagining that K hoped and expected that JFK would behave as Nixon (who, but for false voting in 1960 would have been in JFK's place in 1962) actually did behave 8 years later.

However, K may have not understood the differences in context in the two cases: in particular, the effect on US politics of K's own prior buildup of Soviet materiel in Cuba in 1962, leading to a JFK warning and salience in the 1962 election campaign (as in 1960): all this on top of the Republican-Democratic history on the issue of 1960-61. (There is a new Evans and Novak story of two weeks ago about the possibility of SS-20s in Cuba. Now that Castro may again be a salient target, after Iraq, could this whole issue come back?!)  
*Now, bananas! (IRBMs?) in Cuba vs. ABM? 4-12*

Hampson compares JFK's handling of the missile crisis in 1962 to Nixon's of Cienfuegos in 1970. Compare LBJ's reaction to news of night attacks in the Tonkin Gulf in August of 1964 and in September, 1964!

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See important marginal notes on article!



Crises, January 22, 1987

# Averting Failure, Risking Catastrophe

How do catastrophic failures of social policy come about? Detailed retrospective studies of the decision-making process that preceded such failures reveal with startling frequency one or both of two highly paradoxical characteristics of the policymaking:

a) Arguments for proposals, or analyses of a set of options, that totally fail to raise, or address, seemingly-obvious questions about one or more of the alternatives (such as the possibility of the catastrophic failure that does later occur, or of any potential failure at all, let alone any assessment of its probability or scale). Total lack of explicit consideration of what seem obviously critical concerns.

In particular, this commonly takes the form of arguments in favor of a given course--the one that comes to be chosen, eventually with catastrophic results--on the grounds that it is "necessary" to ultimate success of a larger policy, or to avert its failure: but with no estimate offered at all of its cost, or the likelihood of success if it is chosen--or if it is not, i.e. the difference it makes to the probability of success--or of the form or cost of failure of the proposed course.

This emerged in the documentation of the Pentagon Papers research so commonly as the form that proposals took, including winning proposals, that it is identified in my working notes as The Proposal Pattern, or the Desperate Proposal Pattern (since it was associated with the assertion that every course but the one recommended was certain to fail).

Most recently, it has been observed, with some astonishment, in the single decision-making document released by the White House that preceded, and allegedly determined, President Reagan's decision to send US arms directly to Iran (without Israeli intermediaries) in January, 1986, the memo by Admiral Poindexter (drafted by Lt. Colonel North) on which the President was briefed before he signed the recommended Finding of January 17, 1986 that authorized the venture.

As a number of Senators and other critics observed with great perplexity, the memo mentions possible risks (as being outweighed) and implicit reservations by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (who "do not recommend" the proposed course) without saying a word as to what these possible risks are, how likely they are to be realized and the consequences if they are, nor what it is about the policy to which the Secretaries object or why. The impression given by this memo is of inexplicably deficient argumentation or analysis, a "crazily" incomplete or reckless decision-making process, preceding (and perhaps causing) the President's fatal decision.

\* YET, (see 2) this was a "dominant" choice (short-term analysis!) is associated with a crazy reckless, or controversial course, that does produce (as was claimed previously) lead to catastrophe!

DPP  
expresses/  
effects  
evaluation  
but in the  
effect a  
certain  
situation  
(K/T)

O, I think  
(Win, non-win  
or lose/non-lose  
"DOMINATION"  
NO CHOICE"  
NO REGRET,  
REPROACH,  
RESPONS.) \*

or  
cost!

But in this case--as in most of the others--further investigation reveals that the considerations and risks totally omitted from the given document actually have been analysed elsewhere, and have even been brought authoritatively to the President's attention. (This does not eliminate the paradoxical nature of the fact that even one authoritative decision-making document should take a form so apparently deficient; but it reduces its causal significance in determining the decision).

Even before this Finding had been released, we had learned that Shultz and Weinberger had expressed to the President virtually all of the defects in the chosen course that have now materialized (except for the connection with funding for the contras, of which they were not aware and which may not yet have been conceived by North and Poindexter). I.e., they had predicted with considerable clarity and emphasis the scandal the President confronted after the Iranian arms shipments were disclosed by the Lebanese journal, which was bad enough even before the later revelation by Meese of the contra connection. Yet the President had overruled them.

This conforms to the second paradoxical pattern, which has turned up largely since the research on the Pentagon Papers. In particular, it emerges in the research by Larry Berman on the President's decision in July, 1965 to undertake open-ended escalation of US troop commitment to Vietnam. Using documents and interviews from White House sources, unavailable to the Pentagon Papers study, he found that not only Ball (as was already known) but McGeorge Bundy had argued cogently against this course, raising virtually all the questions and criticisms that later events proved to have been crucially relevant and making estimates that were strikingly realistic.

Opposition by Clark Clifford (in great contrast to portrayals of his position at this time) was equally vehement; like a number of Senators LBJ knew and trusted, he used the word "catastrophic" about the course McNamara proposed and the President accepted. (Bundy's characterization of this course--before the President adopted it--was "reckless to the point of folly." The Pentagon Papers--which lacked this document--present almost no case I can remember of language this strong about the proposal of another Cabinet-level official.)

Paradoxically, in the documentation available, the criticisms and estimates raised by foes of the proposal--which would seem to make an overwhelming case against it,

C-II ~~study~~ 1987  
#5758

7 Sept 87

I give credit to station who  
backed down : for their maturity, wisdom,  
self-control, non-machismo; ~~B~~

JFK in Cuba I

K in Cuba II

(de G in Algeria)

(Mao, in Quinn?)

Must I not, then, give Nixon credit for  
backing off - VN '69 from his "Now U.S.!!"

As in the other cases - see esp., Stalin I  
and Cuba II, neither of which led to an  
invasion of Cuba or an strike in Cuba  
(and it now emerges - see Rusk - that JFK  
was preparing to make a major backdown  
rather than launch a strike - as in Cuba I! -  
as long as there was no attack on US men  
by midday Sunday (bad decision has needed  
a reason for Sunday morning? No U-2 - but  
no low-level, either?)

[If JFK did reject it, then he wouldn't take a risk!]



the backer who backed off was not  
acting like K/T: rising catastrophe rather  
than accept certain S-T failure.

But N didn't face S-T election threat;

~~But~~ <sup>and</sup> in '69, N's threat was private;  
so no domestic S-T loss in winning;

yet, loss of power with losses

[ASK DOBRYNIN!]

which he passed to others, with Cambodia.

His back-off must have greatly damaged  
(= in his eyes) the cred. & prestige of his whole  
1969 strategy, and hope for a win before  
1972 ...

JFK's threat was private, too. (and LBJ's in  
1964!) How would a threat have affected  
elections in '62, + '64? of that time?

or, NATO?

It would have covered partly — a stable  
US public has been unintentional [as in Premier  
Gulf today]. Might that have been good?

Is "peace" acceptable to US with an  
SU recognized as equal?

Peace on this term?

[With the existing degree of  
support to NLF's?

And arms?

On both, knocked off?

If are equally legitimate, on the whole!

If it is degenerate for us to supply Afghan  
rebels, isn't that also true for Laos

7 Sept 87

"Take the toys away from the boys"

But how?

By ~~violence~~ non-violence?

"Has any RC given up its power, without violence?"

(Comm. Manifesto)

(Have males, ~~lost~~ militarism, ever been  
displaced from power with violence?

↳ violence makes?!

Can  $U_{235}$  or  $Pu_{239}$  be destroyed by violence?

Rather: share power (woman with man)

change the nature and basis of power  
to a new form (non-militarism)

↳ using the whole form of power  
(including non-collaboration, withdrawal  
of coop, support, of peace and defence + worship!)

Violent Power is gender-specific

(Old men using young men:

largely against women + children,

blockade  
siege

- indirectly or (bombing, massacre)  
directly.

---

SU cannot be visibly changed from  
without (or prob. from within!) without  
evoking counter-violence with the potential  
(like a forest-fire) of destroying most life  
in Northern Hm.

(unlike Nazi Germany, 1939-45: option of  
visible destruction did not risk suicide.)



# Imagining Peace

Eisen  
(Dennis)

"Si vis pacem, para bellum." But...  
without enemies...

(We have been imagining war since 1945...

But Nietzsche... says...

- New Way of Thinking: Common Sense, Common Sense  
Brian Wilton on train... ~~Can it work?~~ or not.

(RF - (Doubt) Robert... ) first sitting

Can it work:

a different kind of power

1969 - N to Ho, SO...

(as in Cuba's Roma; Quincy

(Llewellyn, Berlin...)

Helpful to think '61 was

the same as JFK's in

Cuba's Don't escalate

- Mentally or physically -

to our non-military moves

on the ground

- to Berlin (or Turkey)

or in Berlin')

"OR ELSE..." instability

"irrational" -  
but deliberate

in. (or deliberate move to avert loss of  
peace & one or the other')



Proper ~ the Tanks!

Bert, Cambodia

Pass '71 — Mayday...

Concord?

NEW POWER:

Many was cut off from VN.

Can be, from our testing  
from countries

(~~from~~ mission forbids, in advance)

Marie Duch

Fred Forrest

Statue of Brian Wilson:

Imagin: 1943 vision of UN, & Francos...

[ Avoid Superpower <sup>or count</sup> - military - challenges to each  
other's empire; chase them by others, by

other means: NVR, communication, escape

money, trade; World Law, Anti,

Regat... Regionalism

End CW ; (Military ; Empire ; Vigilante role ; refine)

SU/US = China/US = SU/US 1941-45!  
yugo

(Dorbaachew)

- Budget "bilateral", "state trading", REV... Loc. Dev in TW (+ Ecu)

- Trade with "East" [Encourage openness,

- Cut our spending; spend on dev. Change; uphold strong

- Cuba/VN: US = China/US <sup>with, usually</sup> criticism, but clear on  
Nic/Bogala Roman

- Parity of states with SU

e.g. = ME!

(EE?)

(Mutual renunciation of "Bully" rights...)

- Latin Neighborhood : LA: end "colony" states

- end to support for militarism, "strong men"

- " " " Terrorism

- debt

dependence

- trans of trade

- [Democracy question?] Free-free, trade-free

- New Policy

Column IV

10 Sept

1987

Resolving issues/stuff now not only  
opens officials and decision of that time  
to judgment and criticism;

it does the same to a generation of  
historians, analysts, and their studies;  
and to the mirrors of those officials, and  
the veracity (& the silence)

(as for Hunt, on Koppel, 8 Sept;  
Koppel didn't ask - probably of  
agony - "Did you tell the truth?  
Why not? Why didn't you give  
you can't answer - "No comment" -  
the ?)

Thus, Allison, Seibler, RFK, Hilman... someone...  
accounts are put in question...



→ Had strike lines going up, between 20 Oct  
and 26-27 Oct?

Was it considered banned by blockade?  
(Otherwise, why did McN consider trade  
initiated, on 19-20 Oct?)

Did anyone even discuss Ultimate? (The  
secret, Presidential option of 27 Oct - which  
won, to his surprise!)

---

Was the blockade strategy really like  
WPB's proposal of Oct '64: attack NVN  
and negot? = Sept 4/13 warnings, while venting  
SAMs...

("Shooting out of the balloon")

What N's strat. was thought to be!)

= Commitment is longer '61, after Wall, Vietnam, Cuba I

= Baning of Hawaii, Dec. '72

= invasion of Grenada, while preparing to  
withdraw from

- Being longer, just after, during or before  
"occupying" a humiliation, looking "weak"

Thys: 1) Was, after all, 48-hr ultimatum  
just a background, a bluff, to JFK's  
real hope on Oct 27 — that K would  
accept private deal, accompanied by threat —  
a "last try" before going in the next  
day?

i.e. was the offer, perhaps, more important

2) Was the effective message to K, perhaps  
(not, <sup>(2)</sup> the 48-hr ultimatum (not ambiguity  
between RFK's "tomorrow" i 13 Days, "48 hrs" to  
me, 48-hrs to Adnan & de Gaulle (Bernstein)  
1 — or even <sup>(b)</sup> the explicit, "If you hit  
meon," ... (right down "gone without  
saying" — esp in light of RFK's <sup>(c)</sup> warning of  
loss of control to the military (see K's own  
fears — and his loss, i '64' and JFK's death, &  
con- up of mil.)

but his (d) (public) failure to accept  
public trade, along with his (e) private regret  
of public trade; not <sup>(f)</sup>, private offer of private trade.

d + e were not as discouraging as  
a public rejection of public trade  
would have been (State's proposal (!)  
rejected by RFK/Sec and Pres.  
(for?)

But K + Politicians, including "Lords," had no  
time to explore this encouraging sign — that  
RFK had failed to reject this offer publicly,  
and privately was proposing a move in that  
direction; his "rejection" of the SC proposal  
was private, or was his threat — which  
made either both easier to accept, and  
less binding / credible for US.

(Would K have submitted to a public  
criticism?! He came close — that's how he  
looked! Yet he wasn't textual fully on  
that.)

But RFK talk of "comp" / out of control  
was both credible and effective; K himself  
had partial control of Centro! SAC U-2!  
(How interpreted of K? Note little speculation  
on this!)



And, if mean had been hit, could  
JFK really restrain mil. from response?  
(the Alliance)

Could JFK have refrained from mean  
— in wake of RFK warning about US aid —  
(i.e. could K control on this?)

— even if K told him to refrain from  
mean, because of Castro?

How would that mean have influenced  
policy? Would it not be influenced  
to hit — at least, AA? Insane?

Even JFK would have to see needs  
in refusing...

And if mean, could JFK refrain from  
response if when Castro hit mean?

---

Adrian, currently, failed to consider  
poss. of effective ultimat.

(Nor did McN, JFK, Nitzu...)

~~(Adrian)~~

Yet A apparently saw B as in full control,  
rational, responsible

(See "Eagle Claw," the hostage mission...  
Sam Jang...)

B-52s

B-52s on VC HQ, 1969, - Cambodia

Assass raid on Khmer Rouge



Wf I told no one:

- Obviously, I didn't know Cuba and  
when I saw RFE

- I didn't tell RFE after I heard of Castro,  
since he said he didn't want to discuss  
it. I didn't even bring it up in '67-68.

- nor did I tell anyone else, since I  
couldn't tell about ultimat

(which would be critical to me - since  
I didn't know about Castro's rebellion in  
AA).

- Probably a document to write up whole  
story, in late '64 (or later).

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Ultimate: (Cuban Reservoir?! from '46?)

Cuba II

1973!

1969!

(1972?!)

Title : The Smell of Burning  
Ashes on the Wind  
Constructing a Catastrophe

Stanley Milgram

RK

15 Sept 87

Ph.D. at Harvard

(BA at Queens)

Yale - Obedience

Harvard called him back

without tenure

Daniel Tenen: controversial ethics  
of Obedience studies

[Like me: he studied ethics

opposed/real ethics or back

extremely painful, a "banishment,"

his old professors

obedience, naughty

("I'd have all been picked around of this  
atkins figures...")

show it up at

this over passing, is an authoritarian  
system

Harvard is like an <sup>or incestuous</sup> alcoholic family

(any institution with prestige + power)  
"doing well is the best revenge"

"I'm desirable, to you now, and  
unavailable



Head the pint of yourself that agrees  
with the...

Hold head up high

talk to 20,000, make a movie, write  
a book... with up and power...



## CII

"Before missiles became operational"

i.e. before US the credibility (v safety)  
of a US strike against the missiles was  
advised\* — removing the threat from US  
bargaining.

(the "DE offer")

(MCN's, in '65: RT)

(but RT was not only a threat!)

CPR paper)

i.e. US ~~of~~ objected to the "Closed Door" —  
even worse than SAM's!

We wanted a Open Door — and no  
SU FS threat in dealings over Berlin  
in fall '62. — to confront a US  
FU threat vs. SU tasks (the FU)...

\* Secrecy of US FA., of blockade, seemed  
the threat; and, lack of prior notice of  
negot. See X in 1973 on alert. Why to  
~~what the~~ commit the X (missiles/was not negot.

The goal of ~~attacking~~ running the  
mines before they were operational  
was met — surprisingly, to all, without  
hitting the (or trading).

Taylor claims that for "any of us" "the  
invasion of Cuba was to be avoided  
at almost any cost."

[Did Fullbright really favor  
invasion — as O'Donnell says — or a  
strike, or some jumps?

McG B ? ]

Taylor also joins McN, etc. in denying role  
of mrc. imp. (Wanted: Trumpet)

He even asserts essential party!  
and ignores benign etc!  
or risk of etc to mrcs!

Bligh

18 Sept 87


Does Rumsfeld distinguish the ethics, obligations, loyalties, rights ... of "scholars" at Harvard from those of gov officials?

Is there a difference betw Harvard + RAND/OSD?

Putting aside, what gov officials should have done!

(see Taylor, 4 '82, on "vicious practice of leakage by gov officials

What hostages are you to USG - hopes of clearance, access, trust, prestige, "appearing to help," + money?



Although I opposed FU and found  
me was...

I wrote BNSP & SIOP Options

wrote Kelpatni speech '61

edited Ann Owen speech (pre '62

(another threat preceding

Cuba II!) see Kaban &

and cried at thought of <sup>Long</sup>

going up Turkish minutes under threat...

Explosive!



Is it possible that K saw a  
US blockade or strike might too illegal  
to conceive? that US might do either?

... ~~can that~~  
(He certainly misread US advisors + Pres,  
the!)

---

See O'Donnell on K/JFK attitudes on  
"miscalculation"!

Yet he made US policy postage  
to Castro's "miscalculation" — with  
knowing it! "unintentional"!

see ~~advisors~~, June '82 on JFK's "concern"

He was "servile" (Kahn + Day), but  
not enough — in prolonging crisis + threats!

Nue Sup CII  
Nuclear Superiority

We do know now (Rusk) that US nuc sup  
did not lead JFK to be willing to  
carry out his threat of an air strike!

(just (giving it) he probably would have  
responded to another near plane shot;

and he was willing to take the chance  
on Saturday...

---

Without US nuc sup : if reversed, or parity  
But K could have made counter-attacks  
on Cuba & Berlin — and claimed to discredit  
US threats of FU

(instead of refusing to his fear of  
nuc war, and appeal to JFK to share it!)

---

Suppose, with balance removed, K had been  
in a position to "protect" Cuba as US does  
Berlin & Turkey? (see de Gaulle to JFK, Salinger)  
of FU threats!

Without our sup, would JFK have  
delayed his offer to trade till Oct 28?

(Risk)

or, contemplated an air strike, Oct 16-21,

or threatened, night of Oct 27?!

"bluffed"?!

The "lesson-learners" of 1982 (Time)  
did nothing to dissuade SC from  
costly efforts to catch up, by proceeding  
thru (1962-68 or later!) of its lack of  
value, or by offering to negot or give it  
up! (Not tell R wisely! Not in Carters!)

Note reiteration, "one must not offer  
a superior no choice between humiliation  
and war"

OFFER did that [and war:] in Berlin  
and in Cuba! (VN '72?!) (ME '73? private!)

("non-negotiable": that's what we  
wanted K not to "miscalculate":

our sense of "vital interest"

of "commitment"

of treaty obligations

of "intolerable"

of "prestige"

of our will...

"having no choice"

i.e. believe, and back down to, on threats...

(K withdrawn from Cuba had to be in  
public, after Oct 22 — on things SU  
had not admitted to presence ...

Wf not: get in place for blockade, then warn K  
privately!